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January 1966] Recent Developments 
Federal Registration of Judgments Act Allows 
Execution Upon Foreign Judgment Although 
Suii on Judgment Is Time Barred in 
Registration State-Stanford v. Utley* 
521 
Appellant obtained a money judgment against appellee in a 
Mississippi federal court and registered it the next day in a Missouri 
federal court, pursuant to section 1963 of Title 28 of the United 
States Code.1 Seven and one-half years later appellant gave notice 
in Missouri of his intention to take appellee's deposition to discover 
assets in that state with which to satisfy the judgment. Appellee's 
motion to prohibit the deposition was sustained on the ground that 
no execution could issue upon any assets uncovered, since under 
applicable Missouri law2 no action could be brought there on a 
Mississippi judgment more than seven years old; the necessity of a 
• 341 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1965). 
1. Section 1963, 62 Stat. 958 (1948), provides in pertinent part: 
"A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property now or hereafter 
entered in any district court which has become final by appeal or expiration of 
time for appeal may be registered in any other district by filing therein a certi-
fied copy of such judgment. A judgment so registered shall have the same effect 
as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be 
enforced in like manner. • • ." 
"There seems little to say [about the enactment of the statute] except to express sur-
prise that it was not done sooner." Goodrich, Yielding Place to New-Rest Versus Mo-
tion in the Conflict of Laws, 50 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 881, 890-91 (1950). · 
2. Missouri conflict of laws rules were held applicable in the principal case under 
the rule of Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See Stanford v. Utley, 
341 F.2d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1965) (hereinafter cited as principal case). See also text 
accompanying notes 14 8: 15 infra. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.180 (1949), a provision com-
monly called a borrowing statute, requires Missouri courts to apply the statute of 
limitations of the state in which the original judgment was rendered to suits upon 
that judgment in Missouri. MISS. CODE ANN. ch. 2, § 733 (1942), demands that all ac-
tions in Mississippi founded on a judgment of a Mississippi court be brought within 
seven years after the rendition of the judgment. 
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suit in Missouri to enforce the original judgment was not alleviated 
by the fact that it had been registered in Missouri within seven 
years of its rendition. On appeal, held, reversed. Although suit in 
Missouri on the Mississippi judgment would be time barred at 
present, appellant's registration of his judgment in a Missouri federal 
court the day after its rendition in Mississippi was equivalent to 
his obtaining a Missouri judgment upon the Mississippi judgment 
on the date of registration; therefore, Missouri's ten-year limit upon 
execution of judgments of its own courts is controlling.8 
There has been a gradual expansion of the extraterritorial en-
forcement remedies available to judgment creditors in some common-
law jurisdictions. In 1801 England initiated a judgment registration 
procedure which today covers the various units of the Empire.4 It 
allows a judgment creditor to file a certified copy of the judgment of 
one Empire court in a court of another Empire country and to 
execute upon it there as if it had originally been rendered in the 
second forum.5 Australia and Canada have statutes establishing a 
similar procedure among their states and provinces.0 In the United 
States, however, the most common ritual for enforcing a judgment 
of the court of one state in a sister state is more complex. The 
original judgment is made the basis of a cause of action in the 
second state resulting in the rendition of a second judgment, and 
it is upon this judgment that execution finally issues.7 Since this 
procedure is burdensome and expensive, attempts have been made 
to provide alternative methods of enforcing foreign judgments. A 
number of states allow the judgment creditor to move for summary 
judgment and thus obtain relief without a full trial,8 while others 
3. See note 2 supra. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.350 (1949) provides: "[A]fter the expira• 
tion of ten years from the date of the original rendition or revival [of a judgment in 
Missouri] • • • such judgment shall be conclusively presumed to be paid, and no exe-
cution, or order or process shall issue thereon, nor shall any suit be brought, had or 
maintained thereon for any purpose whatever." 
4. The development is found in these statutes: The Crown Debts Act, 1801, 41 Geo. 
3, c. 90; The Judgments Extension Act, 1868, 31 &: 32 Viet., c. 54: The Inferior 
Courts Judgments Extension Act, 1882, 45 &: 46 Viet., c. 31; Administration of Justice 
Act, 1920, IO &: 11 Geo. 5, c. 81. -
5. The most recent legislation, the Administration of Justice Act, 1920, 10 &: 11 
Geo. 5, c. 81, provides that from the date of its registration under the act a judgment 
is "of the same force and effect, and proceedings may be taken thereon, as if it had 
been a judgment originally obtained or entered upon the day of registration in the 
registering court" 
6. Service and Executions of Process Act, 1901-1912, II Co111. Acts 291 (Australia); 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act, REv. STAT. ONT, 1937, c. 124 (Ont,), See 
generally Leflar, The New Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, 24 N.Y.U.L. REV, 336, 
345 n.25 (1949). 
7. See Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890); McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. 
Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 433.1 (1935); Yntema, 
The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 MICH, L. REv. 
1129, 1144 (1935). 
8. Leflar, supra note 6, at 349 n.38. A summary judgment procedure allows the 
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have adopted the Uniform Enforcement 0£ Foreign Judgments Act,9 
permitting a judgment creditor to register his foreign judgment 
in a sister state which has adopted the legislation. Since registration 
itself is not equivalent to a new judgment, execution cannot im-
mediately issue. Nevertheless, the creditor can levy at once upon 
the debtor's property in the registration state to prevent him from 
disposing 0£ it prior to the rendition of the second judgment.10 
To facilitate the enforcement of some foreign judgments11 in 
federal courts, Congress in 1948 enacted section 1963 of Title 28 
of the United States Code, which provides fdr the voluntary regis-
tration in any federal district of final judgments in actions for the 
recovery of money or property rendered by a federal district court 
0£ any other district. The section further provides that registered 
judgments are to be given the "same effect" they would have if they 
had been rendered by the registration court.12 Relying upon the 
quoted language, the court in the principal case concluded that 
section 1963 is more than a procedural step in the process of collect-
ing a foreign judgment in a federal court. According to its reasoning, 
the registration of a foreign judgment is equivalent to the rendition 
of a judgment in the second forum upon that foreign decree.18 
Therefore, a foreign judgment may be registered in a federal court 
sitting in a sister state at any time when suit could be commenced 
upon it in the second jurisdiction. Furthermore, once a judgment 
has been registered it may be satisfied during the period permitted 
by the registration state for execution upon a judgment of its own 
courts. Since Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure14 
generally requires a federal court to follow, in matters of execution, 
party seeking :recovery to moye for judgment shortly after the commencement of the 
action. The motion is granted if, from the pleadings and affidavits which may be filed 
by any party, it appears that there is no genuine issue of material fact. The proce-
dure is peculiarly applicable when the cause of action is upon a foreign judgment, 
since the judgment debtor's defenses are very limited. See generally Clark, The Sum-
mary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423 (1929); 33 PA. B.A.Q. 278 (1962). Similar economy 
could be achieved, of course, if the judgment debtor allowed a default to be taken 
against him. · 
9. 9A UNIFORM LAws ANN. 287 (1957). 
10. Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42 IowA L. REY. 
202·03 (1957). The author uses Tolley v. Wilson, 121 Ark. 163, 205 S.W.2d 177 (1947), 
as an example of how the cumbersome nature of the formal action on the foreign 
judgment gives the judgment debtor an opportunity to dispose of his assets before the 
judgment creditor's claim can be satisfied. 
11. Foreign judgments, within the meaning of § 1963, are those rendered by a 
United States district court in another American jurisdiction; the provision does not 
apply to judgments of courts of foreign countries. 
12. See note 1 supra. 
13. Accord, Hanes Supply Co. v. Valley Evaporating Co., 261 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1958). 
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 69 provides: "The procedure on executio~, in proceedings sup-
plementary to and in aid of a judgment ••• shall be in accordance with the practice 
and procedure of the state in which the distri_ct court is held • • • except that any 
statute of the United States governs. to the extent that it i_s applicable .•• .'' 
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the practice of the state courts in the jurisdiction in which the federal 
court sits-a directive which has been construed as requiring federal 
courts to adhere to local time limits on executionlli-the result in the 
principal case is justified if a registered judgment is in fact identical 
to a judgment on a judgment. 
If section 1963 was designed to make a registered judgment inter-
changeable with a judgment on a judgment, it failed in one potenti-
ally significant regard. A final judgment of one court may sometimes 
be attacked, and its enforcement prevented, upon certain limited 
grounds when the judgment creditor seeks to satisfy it in another 
state.16 Ordinarily the judgment debtor may raise these defenses 
when suit upon the original judgment is commenced in the second 
forum, because the judgment creditor bringing the action must 
observe all the formalities incident to any suit, including notification 
to the judgment debtor of its pendency.17 Of course, the judgment 
creditor must bring his suit in the second state within the period 
allotted by the local statute of limitations. Normally, notice will be 
served upon the judgment debtor shortly after the action is begun 
and, in fact, must be given within a reasonable time thereafter.18 
These time limits have the combined effect of forcing the debtor, 
or his representative if he is dead, to rely upon only relatively re-
cent history to formulate a defense to the creditor's action. Indeed, 
the enactment of any statute of limitations is partially motivated by 
the legislature's desire that the evidence necessary to sustain the 
defendant's effort to protect his rights be relatively fresh and acces-
sible.19 The rule that notice must be given to the defendant shortly 
after suit is commenced also assists in accomplishing this purpose.20 
The problem toward which these measures are directed could 
be most acute where the cause of action is based upon a foreign 
judgment taken by default against a now deceased defendant. Un-
like the situation in many types of claims against an estate where 
those close to the decedent are likely to have some awareness of 
the circumstances of the claim and thus a starting point from which 
to build a defense in his absence, it is probable that the judgment 
creditor is the only living person who knows whether the alleged 
judgment debtor was properly served with the process of a court 
which had jurisdiction prior to default. Section 1963, however, 
15. Miller v. United States, 160 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1947). 
16. The judgment debtor may defend on such grounds as lack of jurisdiction in 
the original court, fraud in obtaining the judgment, or prior satisfaction of the judg• 
ment. See generally REsTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 4-11 (1942); id., Explanatory Notes 
§ 47(e) (1942). 
17. See Leflar, supra note 6, at 346--48; Paulsen, supra note 10, at 202; Yntcma, 
. supra note 7, at 1144. 
18. See Murphy v. Citizens Bank, 244 F.2d 5ll, 512 (10th Cir. 1957): Hoffman v. 
Wair, 193 F. Supp. 727, 733 (D. Ore. 1961); 9 MD. L. REv, 74, 77-78 (1948). 
19. See Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 814 (1944). 
20. See Barthel v. Stamm, 145 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1944). 
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leaves the judgment debtor at a disadvantage because it lacks a 
provision requiring that notice of the fact of registration be given . 
him at the time registration occurs. Unless he happens to discover 
that a judgment against him has been registered, therefore, a judg-
ment debtor would not necessarily become aware of the claim until 
execution-when his property is actually seized or when, as in the 
principal case, he receives notice of the creditor's intention to 
take his deposition to uncover assets. 
As construed by the principal case, section 1963 allows registra-
tion of a foreign judgment any time within the registration state's 
statute of limitations applicable to suits upon such judgments, and 
execution upon it any time thereafter within the period allowed- by 
the same state's statute for execution upon judgments of its own 
courts. Had the appellant in the principal case both registered his 
judgment and sought execution upon it at the latest dates per-
missible under the court's interpretation of section 1963, almost 
seventeen years21 would have elapsed from the date the original 
judgment was rendered to its execution or until appellee would 
necessarily have received notice that a purportedly valid claim was 
pending against him. Thus, notice could have been delayed years 
beyond the deadline applicable if the judgment creditor had been 
forced to rely upon the traditional enforcement process requiring 
him to sue on the original judgment in Missouri within ten years 
after its rendition in Mississippi, and to serve process within a reason-
able time after commencing the Missouri suit. 
Enforcement procedures analogous to section 1963 require that 
a judgment debtor be given notice of the claim against him and an 
opportunity to defend his interests at the time of registration. The 
English Administration of Justice Act, which is quite similar in 
many respects to section 1963,22 demands that the registration court 
make rules "for the service on the judgment debtor of notice of 
the registration of the judgment."23 Similar notice requirements 
currently a part of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
Act have been kept intact in the Commissioner's proposed revision, 
which is designed to make registration under the act equivalent to 
the rendition of a final judgment in the registration state. This effect 
of the proposed revision is in explicit imitation of section 1963 as 
the Commissioners interpreted it even before the instant decision.24 
21. The judgment creditor could register his judgment just within the seven-year 
limit from the date of its rendition in Mississippi set by MISS. ConE ANN. ch. 2, § 733 
(1942), and made applicable in Missouri by the latter's borrowing statute, Mo. REv. 
STAT. § 516.180 (1949). He would then have an additional ten years to execute upon 
it under Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.350 (1949). See notes 2 &: 3 supra. 
22. See note 5 supra. 
23. 10 &: 11 Geo. 5, c. 81, pt. II, § 9(4). 
24. ALI, REPORT OF 11lE COMMI'lTEE To COOPERATE WlTII 11lE ALI OF 11lE NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW 94, 290-91 (1964). Even though 
registration is equivalent to a final judgment under the proposed revision, individual 
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The court in the principal case construed the statute before it
in the way most beneficial to judgment creditors. Certainly no fault
can be found with this, for the section was designed to assist creditors
in enforcing judgments. An amendment to section 1963 modeled on
the notice provisions of the Administration of Justice Act or the
Uniform Act, however, would guarantee that no unwarranted bene-
fit to the judgment creditor could be gained at the expense of his
debtor. In the meantime, courts should be reluctant to view the
principal case as meaningful precedent unless they are satisfied that
the judgment debtor has not been prejudiced by the delaying of
notification of his opponent's claim beyond the time he would have
received it were there no federal registration of judgments legis-
lation.
state legislatures may elect, under proposed § 3(c), to suspend execution for a limited
period after registration, presumably to allow the judgment debtor to raise any de-
fenses he may have to the original judgment before the registered judgment is satisfied.
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